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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 08-1818
____________
DARRIN ROBINSON,
                  Appellant
v.
PHILLIP JOHNSON; JEFFREY FORTE; DANIEL E. HOOPER;
MARTIN HORN; JOSEPH ESSEDY (or ECSEDY);
ROBERT ONSTOTT, in their individual capacities
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-03-cv-01545)
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 23, 2009
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 27, 2009)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Darrin Robinson appeals from the Magistrate Judge’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants Martin Horn and Phillip Johnson.  We will reverse the
2Magistrate Judge’s order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
In June 2002, Darrin Robinson was an inmate in the Restricted Housing Unit
(RHU) at the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (SCI-Pittsburgh). 
At the time, policies in force at SCI-Pittsburgh mandated that prisoners housed in the
RHU were periodically to be taken outside for exercise, where they were to be placed in
special “cages” designed for that purpose.  Under prison procedures, corrections officers
were to place two handcuffed prisoners in an exercise cage at one time and then, while
standing outside the cage, reach through a slot to remove each prisoner’s handcuffs.
On June 26, 2002, Corrections Officer Robert Onstott, following this procedure,
handcuffed Robinson’s hands behind his back and put him in an outdoor exercise cage
with another inmate from the RHU, Troy Cooper.  Cooper’s handcuffs were removed
first.  As soon as Cooper’s hands were free, he attacked Robinson, whose hands were still
bound, stabbing him repeatedly in the face and neck with an improvised knife fashioned
from a plastic food tray, before ultimately being subdued.
3On June 28, 2002, Robinson filed a grievance concerning the incident under
Pennsylvania’s Inmate Grievance System Policy, DC-ADM 804, in which he wrote that
he was taken to the cage “as per procedure,” recounted his injuries, and requested that
“disciplinary actions be taken against those responsible for this neglect, a change in
procedures that allow for protection, and money to compensate for [his] injuries and any
future and present medical care.”  App. 39.  Robinson’s grievance went through all three
stages of review within Pennsylvania’s Inmate Grievance System and was denied at each
stage.
Robinson then filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Horn, the then-Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Johnson, the
then-Superintendent of SCI-Pittsburgh; Corrections Officer Onstott; and three other
prison guards.  In his complaint, Robinson alleged that the defendants failed to protect
him from being attacked by Cooper, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The parties consented to adjudication by a Magistrate Judge, and the defendants
moved for summary judgment.  Ultimately, the Magistrate Judge granted summary
judgment in favor of all defendants.  As relevant here, the Magistrate Judge granted
summary judgment in favor of Horn and Johnson because, she concluded, Robinson
procedurally defaulted his claims against them by failing to identify them by name in his
grievance.  This timely appeal followed.
4II.
The Magistrate Judge presided by consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and had
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  See Skretvedt v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 200 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2004).  We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3) and 1291.  See Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 200 n.7 (citing Abrams v.
Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1209 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995)).  We exercise plenary review over
a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment, applying the same standard the
district court should apply.  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009); Williams
v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007).  Summary judgment is appropriate only “if
the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  The facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences from the
evidence must be drawn in that party’s favor.  Conopco, Inc. v. United States, 572 F.3d
162, 165 (3d Cir. 2009).
III.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), a prisoner may not bring
a § 1983 suit with respect to prison conditions – such as this suit – “until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  This
exhaustion requirement contains a procedural default component; in other words,
5exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is “‘proper exhaustion,’ meaning that the prisoner must
comply with all the administrative requirements and not merely wait until there are no
administrative remedies ‘available.’”  Williams, 482 F.3d at 639 (quoting Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-103 (2006)); accord Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-30 (3d Cir.
2004).  “‘[P]rison grievance procedures supply the yardstick’ for determining what steps
are required for exhaustion [under § 1997e(a)].”  Williams, 482 F.3d at 639 (quoting
Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231); see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (“[I]t is the
prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper
exhaustion.”).
Here, Horn and Johnson do not contest that Robinson “exhausted his
administrative remedies in the literal sense”; he pursued his grievance through
Pennsylvania’s Inmate Grievance System until there were no “further avenues of relief
. . . available to him” within that system.  Spruill, 372 F.3d at 232.  This dispute centers
instead on the procedural default component of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. 
Specifically, the defendants assert that Robinson procedurally defaulted his claims against
them by failing to identify them by name in his grievance.  In this regard, they point to a
passage from Pennsylvania’s Inmate Grievance System Policy, which provides in relevant
part:
“The inmate shall include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim. . . . 
The inmate should identify any persons who may have information that
could be helpful in resolving the grievance.  The inmate should also include
information on attempts to resolve the matter informally.  The inmate may
6also specifically state any claims he/she wishes to make concerning
violations of Department directives, regulations, court orders, or other law.”
App. 47-48 (DC-ADM 804, Part VI.A.1.g).
In Spruill, we interpreted an earlier – but in all material respects identical – version
of this paragraph.  372 F.3d at 232-35.  In doing so, we explained that “[t]he verbs in this
paragraph establish three tiers of grievance components:  items that are mandatory
(‘shall’); items that are required to the extent practicable (‘should’); and items that are
optional (‘may’).”  Id. at 233.  Here, then, under Spruill, if the identities of Horn and
Johnson were “facts relevant to the claim” then it was mandatory for Robinson to name
them in his grievance; if they were “persons who may have information” or with whom
Robinson made “attempts to resolve the matter informally” then Robinson was required to
identify them if practicable; and if they did not fall into any of these categories then
Robinson was not required to identify them at all.  See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234.
We are unconvinced by our review of the record that the defendants’ names were
facts relevant to Robinson’s grievance or that Robinson made attempts to resolve the
matter informally with them.  And while the defendants surely had information that could
have been helpful in resolving Robinson’s grievance, we are skeptical that they have met
their burden of demonstrating that it was “practicable” for Robinson to identify them as
the relevant policymakers; the evidence in the record tends to show that prisoners at SCI-
Pittsburgh did not have access to the policies and procedures governing the administration
of security in the RHU, much less the identities of the prison officials responsible for
7formulating and implementing those policies and procedures.  Indeed, during discovery,
Johnson objected to Robinson’s request for production of the relevant procedures manual
on the ground that it was “privileged and confidential” and that “[p]roducing this
documents [sic] could pose . . . a security risk for inmates, staff and/or the institution.” 
S. App. 61.  On this record, we do not believe that Robinson procedurally defaulted his
claims against Horn and Johnson.
In any event, even if Robinson had procedurally defaulted his claims against Horn
and Johnson by failing to identify them in his grievance, the prison’s grievance process
excused those procedural defaults.  The Initial Review Response (IRR) to Robinson’s
grievance – the first-level determination of his grievance under the Inmate Grievance
System Policy – noted that “[t]he yard procedures for R.H.U. inmates has been modified.” 
App. 40; see App. 48-50 (DC-ADM 804, Part VI.B); cf. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 232
(discussing the “three stages of review within Pennsylvania’s Grievance System”).  And
Johnson personally denied Robinson’s “Appeal to Facility Manager” – the second stage
of review under the Inmate Grievance System Policy, see App. 50-51 (DC-ADM 804,
Part VI.C) – indicating in his written response:  “It is unfortunate that this assault
happened to you at SCI-Pittsburgh, but RHU yard procedures have been modified to
prevent something like this from happening again.”  App. 42.  “‘The primary purpose of a
grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a
particular official that he may be sued.’”  Williams, 482 F.3d at 640 (quoting Jones, 549
8U.S. at 219).  These documents indicate that Robinson’s grievance succeeded in this
purpose, “evidenc[ing] knowledge on the part of prison officials . . . that there was a
problem,” id., and acknowledging that the relevant policymakers, Horn and Johnson,
were “fairly within the compass” of Robinson’s grievance, Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the Magistrate Judge’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Horn and Johnson and remand this action to the Magistrate
Judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
